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TAXING CONTINGENCY FEE ATTORNEYS AS
INVESTORS: RECOGNIZING TLE MODERN REALITY
Robert N. Amkraut
Abstract: In the 1995 case of Boccardo v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit changed the
tax treatment of advances made by attorneys working on contingency fee arrangements. The
court held that, in a specific type of contingency fee arrangement, costs paid by an attorney
are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. This decision not only challenges
assumptions underlying decades of case law and centuries of legal ethical tradition, but it also
undermines the tax accounting principle of matching expenses with related income. This Note
summarizes the traditional rationales for prohibiting attorneys from deducting such costs and
analyzes the Boccardo decision. The Note concludes that both the traditional tax approach to
advances and the Ninth Circuit's approach are flawed and suggests an alternative: treating the
expenditures as investments.
In a typical personal injury contract, the plaintiffs attorney agrees to
pursue a claim in exchange for a percentage of the damages recovered.
Typically, the attorney agrees to advance money for all direct expefises
incurred in pursing the claim. The tax treatment of these advances raises
novel questions: Are the advances "akin to loans" and therefore not
deductible as expenses? Are they "ordinary and necessary" expenses
similar to the expenses incurred by any service professional in the
ordinary course of business? Or are the advances really a form of
investment, made by attorneys who carefully calculate the likelihood of
profiting from their investment?
The characterization of these outlays holds significant financial, tax,
and ethical consequences for attorneys who use contingency fee
contracts. If considered "no-interest loans," the attorney cannot
immediately deduct the outlays as expenses and effectively provides a
long-term cash float to the client while earning no interest and receiving
no tax benefit. If the outlays are ordinary and necessary business
expenses, the attorney receives significant tax benefit by deducting the
expenses as they are incurred, but recognizing the income associated
with those expenses only at some future date if and when damages are
recovered. If the outlays represent investments, then, in addition to
raising tax issues, the attorney may violate ethical norms which
traditionally have prohibited investing in a client's claim.
Until recently, case law on this issue was settled. For over six decades,
U.S. courts consistently found advances made by attorneys working
under contingency contracts to be analogous to loans and therefore not
deductible. Courts relied on two rationales. First, courts examined
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attorneys' high probability of recovering the advances through the
attorneys' careful selection of cases and limitations imposed on sums
advanced. Given the high likelihood of recovery and the attorneys'
confidence in repayment, courts held that the advances represented a
form of loan to the client. Second, courts reasoned that even under a
contingency contract, traditional legal ethics principles dictated that the
client "owns" the legal action taken on his or her behalf. Although an
attorney may recommend a course of action, the attorney is merely the
client's agent and it is the client who decides whether to follow the
advice and is responsible for the claim, including expenses associated
with the claim. Because the client owns the case, courts reasoned, the
client, not the attorney, owns the expenses.
Despite all precedent, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held
in Boccardo v. Commissioner (Boccardo 1)I that expenditures made by
an attorney working under a particular type of contingency contract are
deductible as "ordinary and necessary business expenses."' Although the
decision itself is limited to the "gross fee" arrangement, a seldom used
fee structure, the decision may hold broader implications.
Part I of this Note describes contingency contracts and summarizes
how courts traditionally have characterized advances as a form of loan,
focusing on the "probability of recovery" of these advances and ethics.
Part II examines the facts, holding, and reasoning in the Boccardo II
decision and part III analyzes the decision. Part IV suggests that future
courts should adopt an alternative rule for the tax treatment of advances
by considering them investments. Finally, part V considers the ethical
implications raised by the investment characterization approach and
concludes that ethical rules, as currently applied, generally do not
preclude such an approach.
I. THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE: EXPENDITURES ARE
"AKIN TO LOANS"
As contingency fee contracts became increasingly common in the
1950s and 1960s,3 tax law responded to the challenge presented by
1. 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. Id. at 1020.
3. Prior to World War II, contingency fee arrangements were much less conmon than today. This
may be the result of ethical constraints which prevented attorneys from payin.g client expenses. See
infra part I.C. The earliest case to address the tax treatment of attorneys in a, contingency fee-like
arrangement is Cochrane v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 202 (1931). In a divorca action for a wealthy
client, Cochrane, an attorney, deducted expenses incurred under a promie from the client to
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attorneys making expenditures on behalf of clients. In a series of rulings
against attorneys, courts held that advances are not "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses but rather constitute a type of no-interest
loan secured by the eventual recovery. Courts based this approach on the
attorneys' high probability of recovering the advances and on ethical
rules prohibiting attorneys from investing in their clients' claims. The
following sections examine contingency fee contracts, case law on the
tax treatment of expenses incurred under such contracts, and the ethical
issues underpinning contingency agreements.
A. Contingency Fee Contracts
Contingency fee contracts are the most commonly used method of
compensating plaintiffs' attorneys in personal injury cases.' A fee is
contingent when there is "some chance that the lawyer will not receive
the fee because the representation ends with an unwanted result for the
lawyer's client."'
The most common contingency agreement provides for a "net fee."
Under such an agreement, the attorney agrees to pay all expenses
incurred in pursuing the claim, and the client agrees that expenses will be
reimbursed to the attorney out of any damages received. In effect, the
expenditures act as a lien against the future recovery. The amount by
which the damages exceed expenses is then divided between the client
and attorney based on specified percentages.6 Expenses cover direct costs
incurred by the attorney related to the claim.7 These costs typically
include filing fees, witness fees, travel, and medical consultations.
Expenses do not include overhead or the value of the attorney's time.
reimburse him after the divorce was obtained. Although not a contingency fee contract as they are
understood today, given the uncertainty of obtaining a divorce when he took the case, and given that
his recovery of expenses was predicated on obtaining the divorce, Cochrane's position can be
analogized to a modem contingency fee arrangement. The court disallowed the deduction, holding
that the expenditures were not "ordinary and necessary expenses," but rather advances for which he
expected to be repaid and were thus akin to loans. Id. at 207-08.
4. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern LegalEthics § 9A.1 (1986).
5. Id.
6. A typical agreement provides for a sliding scale with the percentage paid to the attorney
increasing as a case progresses. For example, an attorney may receive 20% if a recovery is received
before filing suit, 33% if recovery occurs after a suit is filed, and 40% if the case actually goes to
trial.
7. Typical expenses include fees for expert witnesses, medical examinations, consultants, travel,
etc.
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"Gross fee" contingency agreements pay a straight percentage of any
settlement amount to the attorney without separately providing for
reimbursement of expenses.' The percentage may be higher or lower than
in a net fee agreement.
B. The "Probability of Recovery" Approach: Advances Are Not
Deductible as "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expenses
Beginning in the 1960s, contingency fee attorneys sought favorable
tax treatment on advances by deducting them as "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses.9 Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code
permits a trade or business to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business."'l A substantial body of case law addresses the issue of
what constitutes an "ordinary and necessary" expense." As a practical
matter, an expenditure which is not deductible as ordinary and necessary
must be either a capital expense or (possibly) a loan.' 2
Determinations over whether advances are deductible have significant
effects. For example, a personal injury attorney may advance hundreds of
thousands of dollars in expenses in any given year. 3 Many personal
injury cases last years before resolution and complex cases may take
longer. 4 If appealed, a given case might take ten years to resolve. 5 For
an attorney in the top 39.6 percent tax bracket who advances, for
example, $100,000 for client expenses, the loss of current deductibility
8. See Appellant's Brief at 15, Boccardo v. Commissioner (Boccardo 1), 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.
1995) (No. 93-70850).
9. See, e.g., Burnett v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); Heam -V. Commissioner, 309
F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1962); Monek v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCh) 582 (1966).
10. I.R.C.§ 162(a) (1996).
11. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Taxation of income, Estates and Gifts 20.3 (1981); Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation § 6.03 (1994).
12. "The principal function of the term 'ordinary' in section 162(a) is to clarify the distinction,
often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature
of capital expenditures ...." Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (citing Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. I 11, 113-16 (1933)). Exceptions include personal expenses, which are never
deductible, and expenditures made relating to tax-exempt income.
13. In a 1987 tax case relating to contingency fees, Boccardo claimed $290,547 in 1978 for
deductible litigation expenses under § 162. Boccardo v. United States (Boccarlo 1), 12 Cl. Ct. 184,
185 (1987).
14. Many cases discussing the deductibility issue address the length of tme before a case is
resolved. See, e.g., Boccardo 1, 12 Cl. Ct. at 185; Burnett v. Commissioner, 4.2 T.C. 9, 10 (1964),
affd, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 0162.00-00 (June 30, 1982).
15. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 0162.00-00.
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would cost $39,600 in income taxes until the case is resolved. In
addition, the attorney loses any income that would be generated by
investing that money.
Cases decided in the 1960s established the probability of recovery of
advanced expenses as the criterion by which to judge whether
contingency fee advances could be deductible as "ordinary and
necessary" expenses. In ruling against a personal injury attorney in
Burnett v. Commissioner,6 the Fifth Circuit noted the efforts by the law
firm to screen clients and the firm's successful track record in recovering
advances.' 7 The court reached this decision by first adopting the rule that
"whether an expenditure constitutes an expense within the meaning of
Section 162(a) must be determined by examining the circumstances and
conditions under which it was made,"' 8 and then finding that, based on
the record, advances were "virtually certain to be repaid."' 9 The record
itself revealed that Burnett carefully screened prospective clients before
accepting their cases, limited his exposure by capping advances, and
achieved a rate of recovery of advances exceeding ninety-eight percent.2"
The court pointed out that Burnett's rate of recovery of contingency
advances actually might exceed recovery from more conventional clients
who assumed personal liability for repayment.2 '
Several decisions subsequent to Burnett closely followed the same
reasoning. In Monek v. Commissioner,2 the Tax Court cited Burnett in
holding that Monek was precluded from deducting advances made on
behalf of contingency fee clients based on his high rate of recovery.23
Just three years later, in Canelo v. Commissioner,24 the Tax Court once
again ruled against an attorney seeking to deduct advances.' In addition
to citing objective factors such as a high rate of recovery, the Canelo
16. 356 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1966).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 759-60.
19. Id. at 759.
20. Id. at 760.
21. Id.
22. 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1966).
23. Id. at 586-87. Significantly, the Monek court found the objective facts, primarily the rate of
recovery, so compelling that the court declined even to consider any additional arguments made
against deductibility. Thus the court did not address whether allowing expenses to be deducted was
unethical or against public policy by undermining traditional notions that a client owns his or her
case. Id.
24. 53 T.C. 217,224 (1969), affd, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971).
25. Id.
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court went so far as to state that mere expectation of reimbursement is
enough to make expenditures "in the nature of loans" and. therefore not
deductible.26
The next chapter in the "probability of recovery" line of cases was the
first in a series of actions brought by James Boccardo. Boccardo is a
successful personal injury attorney with offices in San Jose, California,
and Washington, D.C. In Boccardo v. United States (Boccardo ),27 he
contested the Internal Revenue Service's action denying his deduction of
litigation expenses for contingency fee clients. In the year at issue in the
case, Boccardo claimed $290,547.00 in litigation expenditures as
ordinary and necessary expenses under I.R.C. section 162.28 Boccardo
distinguished his situation from established case law by arguing that both
the practice of law and legal norms had changed. Specifically, Boccardo
argued that, consistent with evolving standards of legal ethics, an
attorney now could pay (as opposed to advance) client expenses.29 Thus,
according to Boccardo, the expenditures now belonged to the attorney,
not the client. The court disagreed, ruling that both the case and
associated expenses remain the client's property and that "[o]nly when
[the expenses] become unrecoverable do they become expenses of the
law firm."3
°
Boccardo I demonstrated that case law in this area was unaffected by
changes in legal practice. Any attempt to deduct advances would be
rejected based on probability of recovery. Almost by definition, any
successful contingency attorney would have a strong likelihood of
recovery and therefore could not deduct advances. An attorney who did
not have a strong likelihood of recovery was not likely, for obvious
business reasons, to remain in practice. In short, the only attorney who
might be able to deduct advances was one who could not afford to
practice law. Although Boccardo I capped the line of cases prohibiting
lawyers from expensing advances, it raised new consideralions based on
evolving legal ethics and practices.
26. Id. at 225.
27. 12 C1. Ct. 184 (1987).
28. Id. at 185.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 187.
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C. Legal Ethics Underpinning the Probability of Recovery Doctrine
In addition to the "probability of recovery" rationale, hundreds of
years of legal ethics and tradition underlie the cases that consistently
rejected advances as ordinary and necessary expenses. Rules of
professional conduct dating back to common law England state that a
client is responsible for and owner of a legal claim.3' Just as the client
owns the claim, so too the client owns the expenditures associated with
the claim. 2 Federal tax law buttresses the ethical constraint by
prohibiting deductions for any payment which "subjects the payor to a
criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or
business."33 Because violating the ethical codes as enacted in the Rules
of Professional Conduct subjects an attorney to possible disbarment (a
"loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade"), deductions for
advances could be prohibited under this combined tax law and ethics
analysis.
Concerns about lawyers "owning" cases grew out of prohibitions
against maintenance and champerty which originated in medieval
England.34 Maintenance has been defined as "improperly stirring up
litigation and strife by giving aid to one party to bring or defend a claim
without just cause or excuse. 35 Champerty is a form of maintenance
31. See Wolfram, supra note 4, § 8.13.
32. This approach appears unique to attorneys. In contingency situations not directly involving
attorneys, non-attorney taxpayers have been permitted to deduct expenses associated with their
contingent claims. In Alleghany Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 298 (1957), an investment
corporation, Alleghany, was allowed to deduct over $500,000 in expenses paid to help a bankrupt
company owned by Alleghany fight for a more favorable valuation of Alleghany's ownership
interest in the company. The expenditures were incurred under the express agreement that if the
bankruptcy proceedings awarded these costs to the company and to the attorneys hired by Alleghany,
then the company and attorneys would reimburse Alleghany. Id. at 301. In effect, the IRS permitted
Alleghany to deduct expenses incurred in pursuing what amounted to a contingency claim in the
bankruptcy court. In Electric Tachometer v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 158 (1961), Electric Tachometer
Corporation deducted moving expenses resulting from a state highway condemnation. While
acknowledging that Electric Tachometer was entitled to eventual reimbursement, the court found that
because the amount of reimbursement was contested, petitioner had no "fixed right" to
reimbursement and therefore the expenditure did not constitute an advance against a future
repayment from the state. Id at 162. The fact that a contingency fee attorney is held to a different
standard than other taxpayers clearly is demonstrated by these cases. An attorney with no entitlement
to any recovery may not deduct advances for client expenses. However, a corporation with an
acknowledged legal claim, but where the contest is over how high the reimbursement will be, is
permitted to deduct expenses pursuing that claim.
33. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (1996).
34. Wolfram, supra note 4, § 8.13.
35. Id. § 8.13 (quoting Lord Denning).
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where the person assisting in the litigation (presumably the attorney)
becomes an interested investor because of a promise by the assisted
person to repay the investor with a share of recovery. 6 Under the
common law, maintenance and chanperty were criminal offenses.37
The rule against maintenance and champerty sought to prevent
meritless claims by prohibiting attorneys from "investing" in their
clients' cases.3" A party was thought more likely to pursue a spurious
claim if someone else (the attorney) paid the costs. Making the client
responsible for all expenses was seen as an ethical constraint on the
attorney as well as a way of reducing the amount of litigation.39
Early United States legal practices followed the English common law
prohibitions; contingency fee agreements between attorneys and clients
were considered champertous." Sometime after the Civil War, individual
states began permitting attorneys to advance client expenses as long as
the client remained obligated to repay the advances.4 By the turn of the
century, most states permitted such advances.42 Ethical acceptance of this
practice was formalized in the Canons of Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association (ABA) in 1908 which, grudgingly, permitted attorneys
to advance client expenses.43 The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code), adopted by the ABA in 1969, continued
the 1908 Canons. Under the Model Code's ethical considerations, an
attorney could advance expenses, but was required to hold the client
personally liable for the advances." An attorney thereJfore could not
ethically make advances at his or her own risk.
As personal injury practices based on contingency fee contracts
became more popular, the Model Code's restrictions came under
increasing attack. Indigent clients asserted the rule discriminated against
them because they could not afford to assume liability for the costs
36. Id. § 8.13.
37. Id. Maintenance and champerty remained crimes in England until 1967.
38. Id. § 9.4.1.
39. Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Law of Lawyering: a Handbook on the Model Riules of Professional
Conduct § 1.8:601 (1996).
40. Wolfram, supra note 4, § 9.4.1.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics (1908). CEnon 10 prohibits a
lawyer from purchasing any interest in the litigation. Canon 42, adopted in 1928, permits a lawyer to
advance expenses of litigation "as a matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement." Id.; see
also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 288 (1954).
44. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-8 (1969).
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required to pursue a claim.4" In some cases, attorneys simply chose not to
attempt collection of advances made in unsuccessful claims.46 Bar
associations that pressured attorneys to aggressively collect advances
found themselves in the difficult position of claiming protection of public
interest and legal ethics by forcing an attorney to repossess the
possessions of a poor client who, in many cases, was still suffering injury
related to the unsuccessful claim.
As a result of these pressures, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct adopted in 1983 enacted changes. 7 Most significantly, Rule
1.8(e) eliminated the requirement of client liability in cases where
advances exceed damages.48 In addition, Rule 1.8(e)(2) permits an
attorney to excuse all liability for indigent clients, even if the client
obtains damages.4 9
II. BOCCARDO II: FACTS, HOLDING, AND REASONING
Boccardo did not appeal the Tax Court decision in Boccardo L50
However, after consulting a tax attorney, Boccardo began using a
different form of contingency fee contract-the gross fee contract.
Unlike a conventional net fee agreement, the gross fee contract
distributed any settlement amount based solely on specified percentages
and without regard to expenses incurred and paid by Boccardo in
pursuing the action.5 Thus, the client's ultimate award was not affected
in any way by the amount of expenses incurred. 2
Boccardo deducted expenses incurred under his gross fee contracts as
ordinary and necessary expenses. He argued that full recovery of
45. Mark Lynch, Ethical Rules in Flux: Advancing Costs of Litigation, 7 Litigation 19 (1981); see
also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (striking down on first amendment grounds
Virginia law that effectively prohibited NAACP from representing indigent clients).
46. Hazard, supra note 39, § 1.8:602.
47. See Eric S. Chofnas & Laine S. Walker, Deductibility of Litigation Costs May be Affected by
Ethical as Well as Tax Factors, 18 Tax. for Law. 82, 85 (1989).
48. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e) (1983).
49. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e)(2).
50. Boccardo v. United States (Boccardo 1), 12 Cl. Ct. 184 (1987).
51. Boccardo v. Commissioner (Boccardo I1), 56 F.3d 1016, 1017 (9th Cir. 1995); see supra part
I.A.
52. The only exception to this rule is the case of a client who chooses to terminate the relationship
before recovery of judgment. Under both net and gross fee contracts, a client has the option to
terminate the relationship at any time. However, a client who does so is liable for the "reasonable
value" of the law firm's services. This occurs very rarely in contingency fee cases. Less than one
percent of Boccardo's clients chose this option. Boccardo 11, 56 F.3d at 1017.
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advances is less certain under gross fee contracts because, unlike a net
fee contract where expenses are reimbursed before paying the attorney a
contingency fee, gross fee contracts provide no priorily to expense
reimbursement. 3 The IRS challenged the deductions and i:a the resulting
case the Tax Court disallowed them.' The Tax Court held: "The fact that
reimbursement may be somewhat more uncertain under the gross fee
agreements than under the net fee agreements is not sufficient... to
distinguish the two types of arrangements."5 Citing Canelo v.
Commissioner56 for the proposition that the contingent nature of
reimbursement is insufficient to justify treating advances as expenses
under section 162, the court held that a gross fee arrangement differed
from a net fee only in "affect[ing] the degree of contingency."57 The
court concluded that Boccardo failed to substantially distinguish between
gross and net fee contracts and, citing the line of cases capped by
Boccardo I, held Boccardo's advances to be akin to loans."
Not only did the Tax Court reject Boccardo's attempt to distinguish
gross and net arrangements on probability of recovery grounds, the court
also cited the California Rules of Professional Conduct (California
Rules) as an additional basis for its holding. 9 The court noted the
traditional notion, upheld by the California Rules, that a recovery
belongs to the client and that an attorney may incur expenses only with
the client's permission or to advance client interests.60 The court rejected
the argument that under a gross fee contract the client's ownership of the
claim was any less than under a net fee, an argument that if accepted
would allow an attorney to assert a different and more ethically
acceptable claim against the settlement amount.6'
Boccardo appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with a
surprising result. Rejecting the Tax Court's holding that gross and net fee
contracts are not substantially different, and sidestepping ethical
limitations on attorneys, the Ninth Circuit in Boccardo v. Commissioner
53. Appellant's Brief at 7, Boccardo 11 (No. 93-70850); see also infra part III.A.
54. Boccardo v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2739 (1993), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.
1995).
55. Id. at2741.
56. Canelo v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 217,224 (1969), afl'd447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971).
57. Boccardo, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2741.
58. Id. at 2742.
59. Id. (citing California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5-104).
60. Id. at 2743.
61. Id. at 2742.
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(Boccardo 11)62 held that advances incurred in pursuing gross fee
contingency fee claims are deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses.63 While limited to gross fee contingency contracts, this
decision for the first time allows deductions for advances made on behalf
of clients and thus challenges the assumptions of decades of case law and
hundreds of years of legal ethics.
The opinion took just two paragraphs to reject the Tax Court's
probability of recovery reasoning. Finding that a gross fee arrangement
could cause different economic results than a net fee agreement, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that gross fee contracts therefore could not be
"governed by the automatic application of the cases decided on the basis
of the net fee contracts."' The court noted that the necessity of a
personal injury firm paying some client costs is "axiomatic" and that
such payments are "ordinary."65 Finally, in language that could apply
equally to net fee cases, the court questioned the very basis of case law
relating to advances made on a contingency contract:
It is difficult to see how the label of "advances" with its implication
of "loans" can be applied as a matter of law to payments when there
is no obligation on the part of the client to repay the money
expended.... The plain fact is that, under the gross fee contract,
the firm, like other businesses, can only make a profit if it succeeds
in deriving gross fee revenues that exceed its own expenses--that
is, if it succeeds in keeping its own costs, including the type singled
out by the IRS, lower than the fees it obtains over the course of a
given year from the clients whose cases are successful.66
Having rejected the probability of recovery theory as a basis for
denying the deduction of advances as expenses, the Ninth Circuit then
addressed ethical considerations. Once again, the opinion rejected the
Tax Court holding.67 First, the opinion noted that Boccardo's practice in
Washington D.C. faced no ethical challenge because in 1980 the District
of Columbia "jettisoned" the requirement that a client is ultimately
responsible for expenses.68 Turning then to Boccardo's San Jose practice,
the court observed that California retains the old rule mandating client
62. 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
63. Id. at 1020.
64. Id. at 1018.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.at 1019.
68. Id.
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liability for expenses, but that an exception is made for attorneys who
advance expenses when repayment is contingent on the outcome of the
case.69 The court then noted, with approval, that various state
prohibitions against a lawyer paying client expenses had been
undermined in contexts other than personal injury.70
Finally, after discussing the ethical issues involved, the court found no
need to even consider the California Rules in applying I.R.C. section 162
to Boccardo. I.R.C. section 162(c) prohibits deductions for any payment
illegal "under any law of the United States, or under any law of a State
(but only if such State law is generally enforced), which subjects the
payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in
a trade or business."'" The court found that no federal law prohibits a
lawyer from paying client expenses. While the California Rules might
constitute state law, the violation of which could result in revocation of a
lawyer's license,' the court found no evidence presented that they are
enforced. In fact, the court found just the opposite: that there was
evidence that such restrictions are not enforced. 3 The court concluded
that where there is no evidence of violation of federal or state law the
court cannot use unenforced generalized ethical constraints to deny
deductions. Specifically, the court stated: "The line of ethical inquiry
pursued by the Tax Court ends when it becomes apparent that the criteria
set by § 162(c) for disqualifying a deduction have not been met."'74
III. ANALYSIS OF BOCCARDO 1H
Boccardo 1H provided the opportunity for an appellate court to
reconsider traditional rationales for the nondeductibility of contingency
fee advances. The probability of recovery rationale, as the court correctly
pointed out, is based on the tenuous logic that advances are somehow
like loans even though there is no obligation to repay thera.75 In no other
69. Id. (citing California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-21 0(A)(3)).
70. Id. (citing Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991)). In Rand, the Seventh Circuit
rejected New York prohibitions against lawyen; paying expenses in class action cases. Rand, 926
F.2d at 601.
71. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (1996).
72. Legal ethics codes are enacted by each state's bar and adopted by the statc supreme court, thus
giving the codes the force of state law.
73. Boccardo II, 56 F.3d at 1020 (citing Ojeda v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 1D Cal. Rptr. 2d 230
(1992) and William F. Flahaven, California Practice Guide: Personal Injury 1 182 (1993)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1018.
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tax setting is a loan defined by its likelihood of repayment.76 The second
traditional rationale, ethical prohibitions, has also been overtaken by
current legal practice. As the Boccardo II court explained, these
prohibitions have either been formally changed or abandoned in
practice." Unfortunately, having spotted the problems in the traditional
analysis of advances, the court's subsequent analysis is incomplete and
faulty.
The first flaw in the Ninth Circuit's analysis involves a threshold
matter; the finding that Boccardo's gross fee agreement has a different
"economic result" than the net fee agreements considered in prior cases.78
By making this finding, the court apparently found itself unconstrained
by precedent. Unfortunately, the court failed to indicate just what those
economic differences are. As demonstrated below, the economic
differences are, in reality, minor, and are generally irrelevant to the legal
issue being considered-the tax treatment of advances. In addition, the
court entirely overlooked an earlier stipulation by the parties that there
are no economic differences between the two types of agreements. Once
beyond the economic difference threshold issue, the court concluded that
if advances are not "akin to loans" then they must be ordinary and
necessary business expenses. This approach ignored a fundamental
principle of accounting, matching income with related expenses. It is a
giant leap from finding that gross fees are economically different from
net fees to holding that advances made in gross fee contracts are
"ordinary and necessary" expenses under I.R.C. section 162.
76. Although "debt" is referenced in various sections of the tax code, see Bittker, supra note 11,
33-3. the only actual definition of debt is provided by the regulations-for-bad-debt section of the
code: "A bona fide debt is a debt which arises from a debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid
and enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money." Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c)
(as amended in 1986). A client advance made under either a net or gross fee contingency contract
simply does not result in an "enforceable obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money."
Although I.R.C. § 166 definitions do not conclusively determine whether an expenditure is a loan or
a § 162 ordinary and necessary expense, Burnett v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir.
1966), it is odd to suggest that such expenditures are akin to loans but should not be evaluated by the
definition of the term most similar to loan. Scholars have argued that the definition provided by §
166 should be applied to all sections of the code. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 11, 33-3. The "debt"
characterization dates back to a time when attorneys were obligated to formally require clients to
reimburse the attorney for any advances made. In today's practice of law, however, neither statute
nor common sense justifies defining an advance as a loan.
77. Boccardo 11, 56 F.3d at 1019.
78. Id. at 1018.
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A. The Court's Analysis of Economic Differences Between Net and
Gross Fee Contracts Is Flawed and Overlooks a Stipulation That
There Are No Economic Differences.
The court accepted Boccardo's assertion that gross and net fee
contracts produce different economic results and therefore must be
analyzed differently.79 Under the well accepted tax principle that the IRS
may examine the substance of a transaction rather than its form, a failure
to find such a difference would, per principles of stare decisis, preclude
the need for further analysis.8" Thus, this finding of economic difference
was fundamental, as a threshold matter, to the Boccardo 11 holding. A
close analysis of the two forms of agreements reveals that there are
economic differences. Although these differences may affect
dramatically which form of agreement is more profitable to the attorney,
they only marginally relate to the probability of recovering advances, the
central issue in the case.
As described in part I of this Note, the main difference between gross
and net fee contracts is how expenses are reimbursed to the attorney. In a
net fee arrangement, expenses are first deducted from the settlement and
reimbursed to the attorney. The attorney then receives a contingency
percentage of the remaining balance. In a gross fee agreement, the
attorney receives a set contingency percentage of the settlement as
payment in full. For bookkeeping purposes, the gross fee attorney then
"reimburses" himself or herself for expenses advanced. Any balance
remaining represents the attorney's actual income. From the client's
perspective under a gross fee arrangement, the amount of expenses is
irrelevant since the client's "take" is not affected by expenses.
The differences between the two types of agreements are best shown
by examples. As illustrated below, barring the unlikely event of settling a
case without incurring any expenses, a net fee agreement will always be
better for the attorney.8 For these examples, assume a 33-1/3 percent
contingency arrangement and a settlement of $100,000. Only the costs
change.
79. Id.
80. "Substance over form" is a well accepted tax principle which holds that the IRS may examine
the underlying substance of a transaction, "what really happened," rather than merely the form of the
transaction.
81. For an extensive discussion of the economic differences between gross and net fee
agreements, including examples of various scenarios, see Appellants Brief at 15, Boccardo H
(No. 93-70850).
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Example 1: Assume the firm incurs $10,000 in expenses in settling a case for
$100,000.
Net Gross
Cost reimbursement $10,000 $0
Fee payable to firm. $30,000 $33,333
Net: ($100,000 - $10,000) X 33-1/3%
Gross: $100,000 X 33-1/3%
Total received by firm. $40,000 $33,333
Net to firm (Total received minus expenses). $30,000 $23,333
Example 2: Assume the firm incurs $40,000 in expenses in settling a case for
$100,000.
Net Gross
Cost reimbursement $40,000 $0
Fee payable to firm. $20,000 $33,333
Net: ($100,000 - $40,000) X 33-1/3%
Gross: $100,000 X 33-1/3%
Total received by finn. $60,000 $33,333
Net to finn (Total received minus expenses). $20,000 $(6,667)
Example 3: Assume the finn incurs no expenses in settling a case for $100,000.
Net Gross
Cost reimbursement $0 $0
Fee payable to firm. $33,333 $33,333
Net: $100,000 X 33-1/3%
Gross: $100,000 X 33-1/3%
Total received by firm. $33,333 $33,333
Net to firm (Total received minus expenses). $33,333 $33,333
Example 4: Assume the firm incurs $300,000 in expenses in settling a case for
$100,000.
Net Gross
Cost reimbursement $100,000 $0
Fee payable to firm. $0 $33,333
Net: ($100,000 - $300,000) X 33-1/3%
Gross: $100,000 X 33-1/3%
Total received by firm. $100,000 $33,333
Net to firm (Total received minus expenses). $(200,000) $(266,667)
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From an attorney's perspective, a net fee agreement is; almost always
preferable to a gross fee agreement. For this reason, nearly all
contingency attorneys work under net fee contracts. However, the
relative advantage to attorneys of net over gross fees is irrelevant to the
rationale denying the availability of deductions: probability of recovery.
To get beyond the economically-different threshold, an attorney seeking
to deduct expenses under a gross fee contract must demonstrate that he or
she is less likely to recover advances. The fact that one form of
contingency agreement results in larger returns to an attorney should
have no bearing on deductibility.
The only difference between gross and net fee agreements, as they
relate to probability of recovering expenses, occurs in cases where
expenses represent either a high percentage of recovery or exceed
recovery (refer to examples two and four above). Thus, it is possible that
a gross fee attorney would not recover full expenses in a case where a net
fee attorney would. Barring any additional considerations, this might
satisfy the threshold requirement of economic differences. In
Boccardo I, however, there was an additional consideration: The
stipulated facts in the Tax Court established that the percentage of
expense reimbursement was identical in net and gross fee cases handled
by Boccardo.82
In the face of this factual stipulation, it is difficult to understand
exactly what relevant economic differences the Ninth Circuit found. The
court's failure to state a difference leaves the reader seeking any possible
interpretation which demonstrates an economic difference.
There is only one possible interpretation, admittedly a strained one,
under which in spite of the stipulation, an economic difference may be
found. Interpreting the ninety percent recovery as applying not to actual
dollars advanced, but rather to ninety percent of total cases, and
assuming that the remaining ten percent includes cases where expenses
represent a large percentage of the recovery (refer to examples two and
four above), then it is possible to find an economic difference between
gross and net fee agreements. Apparently, based on these interpretations,
the Boccardo 11 court chose to upend decades of case law.
82. Boccardo v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2739 (1993), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.
1995) ("In a particular case, this may result in less reimbursement . . . . However, the overall
reimbursement of 90 percent of costs found by the Claims Court for the net fee agreements, and
stipulated to here for the gross fee agreements, was the same under both types.").
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B. Allowing the Deduction ofAdvances Violates the "Matching"
Principle ofAccounting
Having found an economic difference between gross and net fee
agreements, the Ninth Circuit decided to treat advances as ordinary and
necessary expenses. Based on the terse wording of the opinion, it appears
that the court did not consider any alternative analyses. While the
traditional "akin to a loan" analysis may indeed be flawed, classifying
advances as currently deductible ordinary expenses is worse because
such a classification violates fundamental principles of tax accounting. A
brief review of the cash and accrual accounting methods and of the
principle of matching income and expenses in the same tax period
illustrates the problem.
Under the cash method of accounting, expenses and income are both
recognized when actually paid or received." Under the accrual method,
expenses and income are recognized not when cash actually changes
hands, but rather when an obligation is incurred or credit is accrued. 4
Cash method taxpayers may find it in their interest to pre-pay expenses.
By making a cash outlay, a taxpayer generates current expenses without
necessarily realizing the associated income. This strategy accelerates
deductions and has the result of deferring income taxes. This is precisely
what Boccardo sought to do.
Such tax avoidance is not permitted. The well-established principle of
matching income and expenses dictates that expenses, and income
associated with those expenses, must be recognized in the same tax
period." Treasury regulations apply this principle to both cash and
accrual methods of accounting: "If an expenditure results in the creation
of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1995). ("[A]II items which constitute gross
income (whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the taxable year in
which actually or constructively received," and "[e]xpenditures are to be deducted for the taxable
year in which actually made.").
84. Income is reported "when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such
income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy" and expenses are
deducted when "all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability, [and] the amount
of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1(a) (as amended
in 1993), 1.46 1-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1994).
85. Bittker, supra note 11, 105-45. Bittker discusses the concept of matching and provides a list
of cases upholding the rule for cash method taxpayers. For a more general discussion, see
Chirelstein, supra note 11, § 11.02.
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close of the taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible...
for the taxable year in which made."86
Applying this principle to Boccardo 11 illustrates the flaw in the Ninth
Circuit's holding. Mr. Boccardo, like most contingency attorneys, uses
the cash method of accounting. By holding that his advances are
"ordinary and necessary" expenses, the court allowed Boccardo to deduct
all of the expenses in the year paid, rather than in the year the associated
income was realized. Boccardo II thus violates the matching principle
and results in a windfall for contingency attorneys. Attorneys may deduct
advances as they are made while deferring the associated income for as
long as the case takes to settle.
Such an approach violates traditional accounting principles and
therefore it is surprising that the court apparently did not consider any
alternative analytical framework. Most obviously, the court could have
acknowledged the limited economic differences between gross and net
fee agreements, but still retained the traditional "akin tc loan" analysis.
Finding economic differences does not automatically jettison the
traditional analysis, especially in a case such as this where one must
strain to actually find those differences. The court could have reasonably
concluded that, even if gross and net fee contracts are different, the
differences are not great enough to merit undermining established case
law.
IV. ADVANCES SHOULD BE TREATED AS INVESTMENTS
As discussed, both the traditional analysis and the ordinary and
necessary approach are flawed. The traditional approach is based on a
fiction-that advances are like loans. Terming advances ordinary and
necessary expenses, while comporting more with the business reality of
the contingency agreement, violates the tax accounting principle of
matching income with expenses. Fortunately, there is a. third approach
which recognizes the business reality of contingency agreements in
which the attorney advances litigation costs while complying with
accounting principles. This approach treats the advance; as investments
made by attorneys in their clients' claims. Under this approach, expenses
are deducted in the same year in which gain (or loss) is recognized, that
is, when the funds are collected.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1A61 -1(a)(l) (as amended in 1994).
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A. Attorneys Treat Advances as Investments
The "investment analysis" most closely represents what really occurs
in a contingency fee arrangement. When a personal injury attorney
interviews a potential client, the attorney evaluates the strengths and
weaknesses of the client's claim. The attorney considers the evidence,
witnesses, potential amount of the claim, and whether, if damages are
awarded, the defendant has the resources to pay. In short, the attorney
employs experience, training, and knowledge to decide whether or not to
take the case.
This decision is similar to that of any investor considering a new
investment. An investor typically seeks to use assets in the manner most
likely to generate gain with the least risk possible. If an investment seems
promising, the investor expends money, time, or other assets in
expectation of a future return. The attorney, like the investor, controls
certain limited resources. In the attorney's case, these include cash, an
existing overhead, and most importantly, his or her own time and skill.
The attorney evaluates how best to invest these resources by selecting
which claims, of all the claims reviewed, possess the most likely chance
of providing a good return on the investment of these resources.
Once the attorney selects a claim/investment, the attorney expends
assets to pursue a return on that investment. Advances are one
component of these expenses. Advances risk cash in the present in
expectation of a high return when the case settles in the future. The
attorney also expends a certain amount of overhead on each case and, of
course, his or her own time.
This form of investment possesses unique characteristics. The actual
"asset" is not the claim itself because, even with the evolution of legal
ethics over the past decades, an attorney is still not permitted to have an
interest in a client's claim." Rather, the attorney invests in the ongoing
right to represent the client and pursue the claim. Like any investment,
this one bears certain risks. Most notably, the attorney may lose the case
in court, or the attorney's share of the plaintiffs' damages may be less
than the expenses incurred. In addition, a client may terminate the
attorney before reaching settlement."8
87. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.80) (1983). This rule is well accepted by the
various state bars. See, e.g., Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.80) (1996).
88. This is actually only a limited risk to the attorney. The standard contingency fee agreement,
although providing an absolute right to terminate an attorney, requires the client to pay "reasonable
value" to the attorney for work on the claim. In Boccardo's practice, this occurred in less than one
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An analogy to a different type of investor, an investor in mineral
rights, is useful to understand the proper tax treatment of expenses
advanced by a contingency attorney. Mineral rights investors carefully
select what property is likely to possess potential for profitable extraction
of minerals. After selecting a property, the investor advances royalty
payments to the property owner in exchange for the right to mine. The
advance is guaranteed. Even if the land fails to yield any income to the
investor, the property owner retains the "advance." In short, just as a
contingency fee attorney carefully screens cases and dces not recover
advances if he or she loses the case, so too the mineral investor carefully
scrutinizes property and also will not recover advances. However, unlike
in the lawyer's situation, the tax treatment of advances made by mineral
investors is clear. They are deductible not when paid, but rather when the
benefits (income) tied to the outlays are received.89 Of particular
relevance for the traditional akin-to-loan approach is that no inquiry is
made into the mineral investor's past track record as an indicator of
future likelihood of success.
B. Advantages of Characterizing Advances as Investments
Characterizing advances as investments solves both the problems
inherent in the traditional "akin tc. loan" approach and tfie problems in
the Ninth Circuit's ordinary and necessary expense conclusion. As
discussed, the major flaw of the t.raditional analysis is the fiction that
advances resemble loans. The investment characterization eliminates the
fiction by seeing advances for what they are: calculated business
investments made in hopes of high financial return. The investment
characterization also avoids the major drawback of considering advances
ordinary and necessary expenses: the violation of the tax accounting
principle of matching expenses with income in the same tax period. Like
other investments, income (or loss) would be recognized upon
disposition of the asset.90 Here the disposition is the resolution of the
legal claim. Thus, the advances would be deducted at the same time as
the income or loss is recognized.
percent of all claims. Boccardo v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2739, 2740 (1993), rev'd, 56
F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
89. This approach is based on the principle that, even for a cash method taxpayer, prepaid
expenses may not be deductible. Rev. Rul. 77-489, 1977-2 C.B. 177; Rev. R[ul. 80-70, 1980-11
I.R.B. 5; see also Bittker, supra note 1 I, 105.2.5.
90. I.R.C. § 1001 (1996).
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Although this approach is superior to alternative approaches, the
investment analysis presents its own unique challenges. The first
challenge relates to the character of the gain or loss. If an advance
represents an investment, and therefore the attorney is treated as an
investor, then shouldn't the proceeds to the attorney upon disposition of
the investment be a capital gain or loss? I.R.C. section 83 of the tax code
addresses this question. I.R.C. section 83 provides that where property
(the right to pursue a claim)9' is transferred in connection with the
performance of services (legal representation), then the property "shall
be included in the gross income of the person who performed such
services in the first taxable year in which [the person can dispose of the
property]."92 In short, advances may be investments for timing purposes,
but are prevented by existing code from achieving the character of a true
capital asset. They retain their character as ordinary expenses, deferred
until disposition of the asset. The second challenge, ethical constraints, is
discussed below.
V. THE ETHICAL CHALLENGE TO THE INVESTMENT
APPROACH
Legal ethics present the most fundamental challenge to the investment
characterization for two reasons. However, as this Note will explain,
neither of these reasons provide a meaningful impediment to treating
advances as investments. Rather, they demonstrate the difficulty in
general of deciding tax issues based on public policy and the particular
challenge in the case of attorney advances.
The first potential problem is that converting the attorney from a
service professional to a capital investor directly attacks long held
notions of the attorney's role. "Investing" in a client's action remains
contrary to legal rules of conduct. 93 However, as law is practiced today,
ethical injunctions against paying client expenses have become a house
of cards. Traditional ethical compunctions based on common law
concerns of maintenance and champerty are inapplicable in the modem
practice of law.94 Furthermore, even if the bar is intent on retaining some
91. The code considers property an asset unless covered by one of the listed exceptions. I.R.C.
§ 1221 (1996). Because the right to pursue a claim is not listed in the exceptions, it qualifies as an
asset.
92. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1996).
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. See supra part 11.
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of the traditional prohibitions on the practices of contingency attorneys,
the tax arena hardly seems the appropriate forum in which 1:o do so.
The second impediment provided by legal ethics is based on the
jumbled and confused state of ethical prohibitions against paying client
expenses. Many jurisdictions explicitly permit attorneys to pay expenses
incurred in representing their clients in contingency matters, as long as
the expenses will be reimbursed to the attorney out of any settlement
amount.95 Under this approach, a client has no responsibility to repay in
the event that the settlement does not cover the cost of the expenses.
Such an approach is consistent with Model Rule 1.8(e) of the American
Bar Association.96 However, other jurisdictions retain the iraditional rule
holding clients ultimately liable for all expenses incurred on their
behalf.97 Further confusing matters, federal courts :aave rejected
prohibitions against paying client costs in certain types of cases.98
Finally, even in those states which retain the traditional rules,
enforcement is inconsistent at best.99
Thus, depending on the state, violations of ethical rules against
investing in a client's claim or paying client expenses may subject an
attorney to sanctions, including disbarment. However, the issue in
Boccardo II was a tax question, not what is permissible within an
attorney-client relationship. General ethical considerations, like broad
public policy grounds in general, are disfavored as a basis for tax
rulings.' 0 Rather, in challenging the actions of a taxpayer, the IRS must
cite specific code provisions.'O' In Boccardo 11, the relevant code
provision was section 162(c), which prohibits deductions for "illegal
bribes, kickbacks, and other payments."'0 2 I.R.C. section 162(c)(2)
establishes a three-part test under which payments may be termed
"illegal" and therefore not deductible. First, the payment must be illegal
"under any law of the United States, or under any law of a State."'
03
95. See Chofnas & Walker, supra note 47, at 85 & n.14 (discussing changes taking place in
ethical prohibitions and listing states that have adopted Model Rule 1.8(e)).
96. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.8(e) (1983).
97. See, e.g., Washington Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.8(e)(1) (1996).
98. See, e.g., Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991). Rand involved a class
action claim. The court ruled that in class action claims, individual claimant; need not be held
responsible for all costs incurred on their behalf, even if this contradicts state bar :ules. Id. at 60 1.
99. Hazard, supra note 39, § 1.8:602.
100. Bittker, supra note 11, 20.3.3.
101. Id.
102. I.R.C. § 162(c) (1996).
103. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (emphasis added).
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Second, the illegal payment must subject "the payor to a criminal penalty
or the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or business."'"
Finally, where the payment violates state law, it must be a law that is
"generally enforced."' 5 The burden of proof for all three prongs of the
test is on the IRS.
0 6
Applying section 162(c)(2) to advances made by attorneys presents
major difficulties. First, the IRS must show that the advances are illegal
under a federal or state law. This raises the question of whether a state
bar's professional rules of conduct qualify as law. Bar rules are typically
adopted by state supreme courts and thus, probably could be considered
state common law. 7 In states where the rules of conduct do not have
force of law, payments of client expenses by attorneys simply are not
"illegal." Thus, under section 162(c)(2), there is no basis to deny
deductibility of these payments.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the payments are "illegal," the
attorney presumably risks disbarment. Although this would satisfy the
second prong of section 162(c)(2) providing that an illegal payment must
subject the payor to "the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade
or business,"'0 8 the final requirement of section 162(c)(2), showing that
the state law is "generally enforced," presents a much more difficult
challenge. In most state bars, there is little desire to force an attorney to
collect payments from a client. 9 Given the flux and uncertainty in
ethical codes governing advances, bar associations are understandably
reluctant to enforce prohibitions against paying client expenses. On a
more practical level, as noted earlier, such enforcement places the bar in
the awkward position of forcing attorneys to demand payment from
clients who have just lost personal injury lawsuits. The specter of an
attorney suing his own client, a client perhaps still suffering the effects of
the injury which gave rise to the lawsuit in the first place, presumably
gives the bar pause. Misgivings about enforcement increase when one
considers that the attorney who is suing for collection is the very same
104. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
105. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
106. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
107. Boccardo II pointedly avoided a direct ruling on whether state bar rules adopted by the
California Supreme Court should be considered "state law," saying only that they "might, in a pinch,
be treated as state law." This was because California had a state statute which regulates the same
matters. Boccardo v. Commissioner (Boccardo I1), 56 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1995).
108. I.R.C. § 162(c).
109. In Boccardo 11, the court found no "evidence of such enforcement" and cited sources
indicating a lack of enforcement. 56 F.3d at 1020.
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attorney who "lost the case," or at least failed to achieve a settlement
adequate to cover expenses, not to mention any recovery for the client.
In short, the IRS will rarely, if ever, achieve its burden of showing
that an attorney who pays client expenses violates a generally enforced
law which subjects that attorney to criminal penalty or the loss of license.
Failing this burden, the IRS is not permitted, as it once was, to cite
general criteria such as "public policy" to deny a deduction. The court in
Boccardo H1 stated this principle: "The line of ethical inqtiry pursued by
the Tax Court ends when it becomes apparent that the criteria set by
section 162(c) for disqualifying a deduction have not been met."'
Attorneys who pay client expenses generally do not violate section
162(c). Therefore, under tax law, ethical constraints and rules of practice
do not prohibit deductions for these expenses, whetaer treated as
investments or as ordinary and necessary expenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Boccardo 11, the Ninth Circuit recognized the problems inherent in
the traditional tax treatment of advances made by lawyers working on
contingency. Advances are neither "akin to loans" nor are they "illegal"
as law is currently practiced. Having properly rejected traditional tax
treatment, the court held that advances are ordinary and necessary
expenses. Unfortunately, this approach violates the tax accounting
principle of reporting expenses and associated income in the same tax
period. The court should have treated advances as what they really are:
investments risked by attorneys in expectation of future financial returns.
The investment analysis avoids the "akin to loan" fiction employed by
case law while adhering to the principle of matching income with
expenses. Although treating the attorney as an investor may challenge
traditional notions of legal ethics, the tax treatment of advances is based
on the IRS code, not state rules of conduct. Until state bar associations
choose to enforce rules against advances and thereby make them
"illegal" for tax deductibility purposes, advances should. be treated as
what they are: investments.
I10. Id.
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